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Abstract. This paper discusses the use and verifica-
tion of magic wands. Magic wands are used to specify
incomplete resources in separation logic, i.e., if missing
resources are provided, a magic wand allows one to ex-
change these for the completed resources. We show how
the magic wand operator is suitable to describe loop in-
variants for algorithms that traverse a data structure,
such as the imperative version of the tree delete prob-
lem (Challenge 3 from the VerifyThis@FM2012 Program
Verification Competition).
Most separation-logic-based verification tools do not
provide support for magic wands, possibly because va-
lidity of formulas containing the magic wand is, by it-
self, undecidable. To avoid this problem, in our approach
the program annotator has to provide a witness for the
magic wand, thus circumventing undecidability due to
the use of magic wands. We show how this witness in-
formation is used to encode a specification with magic
wands as a specification without magic wands. Concretely
this approach is used in the VerCors tool set: annotated
Java programs are encoded as Chalice programs. Chalice
then further translates the program to BoogiePL, where
appropriate proof obligations are generated. Besides our
encoding of magic wands, we also discuss the encoding of
other aspects of annotated Java programs into Chalice,
and in particular, the encoding of abstract predicates
with permission parameters.
We illustrate our approach on the tree delete algo-
rithm, and on the verification of an iterator of a linked
list.
1 Introduction
Verification of sequential programs with pointers has sig-
nificantly profited from the advance of separation logic.
Separation logic is an extension of classical Hoare logic
that explicitly considers the heap [39], which makes it
highly suitable to reason about pointer structures, the
permission to access a heap location, and (absence of)
aliases.
In classical Hoare logic [18], a program is extended
with annotations that express properties about the pro-
gram’s intermediate state. Separation logic is an exten-
sion of Hoare logic that explicitly separates the program
state into the heap and the store. Characteristic for sep-
aration logic is that annotations can also express prop-
erties about resources, where the most fundamental kind
of resource is access permission to a part of the heap, i.e.,
to read or write a location on the heap. Formulas about
access permissions can be combined into larger formulas
using the separating conjunction operator ?. A key fea-
ture of separation logic is that in a formula φ1 ? φ2, the
formula is only valid for a heap, if φ1 and φ2 are valid
for disjoint parts of the heap.
Magic Wands A less common feature of separation logic
is the magic wand operator, also known as the separat-
ing implication, usually written −? . A formula φ1 −? φ2
holds for a heap h if whenever h is extended with a heap
h1 that satisfies φ1, then the combined heap satisfies
φ2. In the literature, this operator is often described as
a trading operator: the resources associated to φ1 are
traded for the resources associated to φ2. Another way
to think about it is to see the magic wand operator as a
promise: it denotes a special kind of resource that pro-
vides the ability to exchange one set of resources (the
required resources) to a different (possibly larger) set of
resources (the ensured resources).
This paper shows how the magic wand operator can
be used to elegantly specify loop invariants for itera-
tive algorithms that explore data structures: knowledge
about the current location in the data structure can po-
tentially be exchanged for knowledge about the complete
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data structure explored so far. We use this approach to
specify a loop invariant for Challenge 3 from the Veri-
fyThis@FM2012 Program Verification Competition [22].
This challenge is to verify an iterative tree delete algo-
rithm: the removal of the element with the least key in
a binary search tree. In the literature, also several other
examples that illustrate the usefulness of the magic wand
operator can be found, e.g., to specify an iterator proto-
col (see [17,2] (discussed in Section 6.2), to reason about
sharing in data structures [19], and to specify several
common object-oriented design patterns [27].
In addition, we also discuss how tool support to rea-
son about magic wands is developed. There are several
tools that allow reasoning about programs annotated us-
ing separation logic, such as VeriFast, SmallFoot, and jS-
tar [24,5,12]. However, none of these tools support the
magic wand operator. Only the notion of lemma in Veri-
Fast [25] resembles a magic wand partially, but it cannot
be used to exchange knowledge about permissions in the
same way as magic wands (see Section 7.1 for more in-
formation).
We believe that the main reason that most separation-
logic-based program verification tools do not support
reasoning about magic wands, is that deciding the valid-
ity of a formula containing magic wands is almost always
undecidable [8]. To overcome this, this paper provides
the means to associate a proof term with an assertion
introducing a magic wand formula, by letting the user
describe how to construct proofs. The proof term is then
used to help the verifier to establish the correctness of
the implementation w.r.t. the specification. Concretely,
a proof annotation syntax is defined that allows one to
specify how to build a proof term for a magic wand. Sup-
port for this proof annotation syntax has been integrated
into our VerCors tool set, a tool set for the verification
of concurrent Java programs.
In order to actually construct the term, we intro-
duce the notion of a witness object to encode the magic
wand formula. The witness object stores the resources
that are needed to exchange the required resources of
the magic wand into the ensured resources. Moreover, it
also contains a description how to perform the conver-
sion. This witness object is generated based on the proof
term provided by the user. It contains several methods
that model the logic rules for this particular magic wand
formula.
Our solution to the verification problem of the magic
wand has been inspired by the Curry-Howard isomor-
phism [20], which turns a verification problem into a type
checking problem by constructing a proof term. This in-
tuition is further emphasised by the way that we write
annotations: formulas are typically manipulated using
logical rules, while witnesses are manipulated by meth-
ods defined on them. Thus, the encoding of magic wand
formulas in this paper transforms the program verifi-
cation problem into the programmatic manipulation of
specification-only (or ghost) objects. We believe that this
approach is attractive for software engineers that have
a more imperative way of thinking about program be-
haviour, while they struggle with logical manipulation
of complex formulas.
Predicates A commonly used extension of separation
logic is the use of abstract predicates [34]. They pro-
vide abstraction and allow one to reason about larger
structures, and recursive definitions. Typical use of an
abstract predicate is to encapsulate the state of an ob-
ject and to hide the internal implementation details from
the specification. Abstract predicates can be parame-
terised by parameters, which can be program variables
or permissions. The latter is useful, for example to spec-
ify different access permissions to different parts of a
data structure. Abstract predicates behave as resources
in their own right. In the tree delete challenge, we use
abstract predicates to capture for example the state of
the tree.
To be able to reason about abstract predicates with
arbitrary parameters (including permissions), there is
ready-available tool support, but using a different style
of specifications. In particular, VeriFast supports predi-
cates with arguments, but it does not support reasoning
about resources and functional properties separately in
order to reuse existing functional specifications. This dis-
agrees with the philosophy of VeriFast. Jost and Sum-
mers present an approach to reason about predicates
that can be split into a resource and a functional predi-
cate [26]. However, there are many predicates for which
this approach does not work, for example when the pred-
icate specifies different access permissions to different
parts of a data structure. Therefore, in this paper we also
propose an encoding of abstract predicates, using the
same idea of constructing a witness object. Concretely,
a predicate with parameters is encoded as a witness ob-
ject with fields to encode the parameters. This allows
replacing the original predicate by a predicate over the
newly defined object that refers to the object’s fields,
where the original predicate referred to its parameters.
Thus, again we trade complexity on the level of logical
formulas for complexity on the level of specification-only
code.
Approach Concretely, in this paper, we consider speci-
fications in permission-based separation logic using the
magic wand operator. Permission-based separation logic
is an extension of standard separation logic, where frac-
tional permissions [7] are used to distinguish read and
write access permissions to a location on the heap [6,
16], which makes it suitable to reason about concurrent
programs.
Permission-based separation logic is used as a spec-
ification language for the VerCors tool set [1], which
targets the verification of concurrent Java programs. It
leverages existing verification tools, and in particular
it encodes annotated Java programs into Chalice pro-
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grams [29]. Chalice is another verification tool for a con-
current programming language, but working on a more
idealised programming language (without inheritance),
based on the theory of implicit dynamic frames [40].
This is an alternative approach to reason explicitly about
pointers in the heap, which is equivalent to separation
logic [37].
Notice that all examples in this paper are sequential.
Therefore, in most examples all points-to predicates are
decorated with write permissions only.
We use our encoding to verify the tree delete chal-
lenge. Concretely, we show that the data structure is
treated properly, i.e., only locations for which appropri-
ate permissions are held are being accessed. Moreover,
we show that the list of elements represented by the re-
sult is the tail of the list represented by the input. In
addition, we also illustrate our approach on a linked list
with an iterator (with remove).
Overview The remainder of this paper is organised as
follows. First, we provide an introduction to separation
logic, and how this is supported in Chalice and the Ver-
Cors tool set. Section 3 presents the tree delete challenge
of the VerifyThis competition and discusses an intuitive
solution for the challenge that uses a magic wand. Sec-
tion 4 focuses on the encoding of predicates with param-
eters. We continue in Section 5 with the elimination of
the magic wand. Then in Section 6, we present machine-
checked versions of the challenge and of an additional
example, namely an iterator protocol. Finally, we con-
clude and discuss related and future work.
2 Background
This section first introduces permission-based separation
logic. Then it introduce Chalice as a tool that can check
a subset of the logic and finally it explains the basics
of the VerCors tool set, and the syntax for permission-
based separation logic in the tool set.
2.1 Permission-based Separation Logic
As mentioned above, separation logic [39] was originally
developed as an extension of Hoare logic [18] to rea-
son about programs with pointers, as it allows to rea-
son explicitly about the heap. In classical Hoare logic,
assertions are properties over the state, while in separa-
tion logic, the state is explicitly divided in the heap and
a store, related to the current method call. Parkinson
adapted separation logic for Java [33], and this is the
variation of the logic that we will use.
Separation logic is also suited to reason modularly
about concurrent programs [30]: two threads that oper-
ate on disjoint parts of the heap, do not interfere, and
thus can be verified in isolation. However, classical con-
current separation logic requires use of mutual exclusion
mechanisms for all shared locations, and it forbids si-
multaneous reads to shared locations. To overcome this,
Bornat et al. [6] extended separation logic with fractional
permissions. Permissions, originally introduced by Boy-
land [7], denote access rights to a shared location. A
full permission 1 denotes a write permission, whereas
any fraction in the interval (0, 1) denotes a read per-
mission. Permissions can be split and combined, thus
a write permission can be split into multiple read per-
missions, and sufficient read permissions can be merged
into a write permission. The use of permissions makes
permission-based separation logic suitable to prove data
race freedom of multithreaded programs using different
synchronisation mechanisms.
Most variants of separation logic strictly distinguish
logical values in specifications from the contents of loca-
tions on the program heap. This provides a more elegant
theory, but allows less freedom when writing specifica-
tions. Therefore, we choose to use the more liberal style
exemplified by Total heap Permission Logic [35].
Formally, we define the set of formulas in this re-
source logic as follows:
R ::= b | κ(−→e ) | Perm(e.f , S) | R ? R
| R −? R | b ⇒ R | *
α:T
R(α)
S ∈ (0, 1], κ ∈ Pred
where b is a first-order logic formula, κ is a predicate in
set Pred, e denotes an expression (with −→e for a vector
of expressions), α is a logical variable with type T , and
pi is a fractional permission, i.e., a value in the inter-
val (0, 1]. Expressions can be qualified expressions of the
form e.f , where f is a field name. Below we will also give
the grammar of the permission-based separation logic,
as supported by the VerCors tool set. All examples will
be given following the VerCors grammar. However, in
the text, we will sometimes also use the more classical,
mathematical notation.
Validity of this logic is defined over resources R,
which consist of a heap and a partial permission table
for the locations in this heap. The permission predicate
Perm(x.f, pi) expresses that the field x.f points to a lo-
cation on the heap and the current thread holds a per-
mission pi on this location. If a thread holds permission
1, this denotes a write permission; any permission less
than 1 denotes a read permission. Permissions can be
split and combined (by division and addition). When
reasoning about concurrent programs, permissions can
be transferred between threads, and they can be stored
as resource invariants into locks. A global correctness
property of the logic is that the total number of permis-
sions to access a certain location never exceeds 1, which
ensures that any program that can be verified is free of
data races.
The separating conjunction operator ? expresses that
a formula φ1 ? φ2 holds for a resource R if the resource
can be split into two disjoint resources R1 and R2, such
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that φ1 holds for R1, and φ2 holds for R2. Separating
conjunction can be lifted over a set of formulas, ranged
over by the logical variable α : T , using the universal
separating conjunction, written *
α:T
R(α).
The magic wand operator −? is formally defined as
follows. A resource R satisfies a formula φ1 −? φ2 if for
every disjoint resourceR′ satisfying the property φ1, the
combination ofR andR′ satisfies φ2. In other words: any
information or permissions described by the formula φ1
can be exchanged for the formula φ2. It is important to
note that by obtaining φ2, one has to give up φ1, thus
linear reasoning is used here. We mimic this in our en-
coding of magic wands. When creating a witness object
for a a magic wand formula, we store permissions inside
the witness object, which can be retrieved in exchange
for the permissions or the formula required by the magic
wand.
Finally, a predicate κ is a, possibly recursive, defini-
tion of a separation logic formula:
κ(−→e ) = φ(−→e ) .
Every predicate must be well-defined, so termination of
the definition must be guaranteed. An abstract predi-
cate is a predicate whose definition is not available to
the client of a class. This is useful to encapsulate de-
tails about the state that should not be used by the
client. It is also conveniently used for axiomatizing the
behaviour of low-level data structures and operations,
such as volatile variables, locks and thread operations.
By declaring a predicate abstract, the client is prevented
from having access to internal details, these are only vis-
ible to the instances of the class itself. This feature is
used in the iterator example (see Section 6.2) to enforce
the calling convention for iterators: only by following the
protocol can the client get access to the predicates that
are required for the next call. For the verification of a
method, abstract predicates that are within the scope of
the receiver object can be opened and closed.
An important restriction on formulas is that they
must be self-framed, which means that the set of loca-
tions that must be read to evaluate the formula is a sub-
set of the set of locations for which the formula specifies
at least read access.
Finally we introduce a derived notation: when we
want to express both permission and value at the same
time, we use the PointsTo predicate that is used in clas-
sical separation logic:
PointsTo(x.f, pi, v)
def= (Perm(x.f, pi) ? x.f = v)
Notice that this relation between Perm and PointsTo
is formally established by Parkinson and Summers [35].
The way we write the logic corresponds closely to their
definition of Total Heap Permission Logic, which in turn
is closely related to the theory of implicit dynamic frames
[40] as supported by Chalice.
2.2 Chalice
Chalice is a tool for the verification of concurrent pro-
grams [29], written in a simple object-oriented language
with built-in specification features. The VerCors tool set
uses Chalice as an intermediate language to encode an-
notated Java programs. Before providing more details
about the VerCors tool set, we first briefly introduce
Chalice.
Supported features of the Chalice language are ba-
sic classes (no static members or inheritance), fields and
three kinds of ‘methods’:
– standard methods, which can be used in execution;
– functions, i.e., to evaluate a property about the state,
which do not use any access permissions and can
therefore be used both during execution and in spec-
ifications; and
– predicates, which can contain access permissions and
can only be used in specifications.
The specification language of Chalice supports field
permissions in the same way as the logic in the previ-
ous section, albeit with a different syntax (acc, instead of
Perm, and && is used as a connective for permissions, in-
stead of ?). Standard boolean expressions and functions
can be used in specifications. Additionally, Chalice has
support for (recursive) predicates, however these predi-
cates cannot have explicit parameters, i.e., they are lim-
ited to the implicit parameter this. Both functions and
predicate definition should terminate.
The Chalice tool verifies annotated code by generat-
ing an annotated Boogie program [3], for which the Boo-
gie verifier subsequently will generate first-order logic
proof obligations. Standard methods and functions map
into Boogie naturally and can make full use of all of the
automatic verification features of Boogie. However, as
Boogie is not natively aware of permissions, these are
encoded into Boogie’s first-order logic annotations, and
therefore reasoning about them is less automatic. Simi-
larly, for predicates reasoning is less automatic, and the
user has to tell the verifier explicitly to replace a pred-
icate by its definition (unfold) or introduce a predicate
in place of its definition (fold).
As a consequence, in this paper we write explicitly
when to fold and unfold predicates, while we do not have
to do this when reasoning about functions, as these defi-
nitions are opened and closed automatically by the Boo-
gie verifier. Instead, to ensure that the verification pro-
cess succeeds, we only sometimes have to add a (prov-
able) property about a function definition.
2.3 The VerCors Tool Set
The target of the VerCors tool set is the verification
of multi-threaded object-oriented programs, in particu-
lar of annotated Java code. Rather than developing yet
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back ends
Tool
VerCors
Chalice Boogie
input language
SAT/SMT
Common Object Language
Fig. 1. VerCors tool set architecture
another verification condition generator, we leverage ex-
isting verifiers. In particular, we use the existing verifiers
Chalice [29] and Boogie [3]. This means that we will en-
code verification problems in the input language as either
Chalice or Boogie programs.
Input for the tool is source code that has been anno-
tated with method contracts. These contracts are trans-
lated via Chalice and Boogie into the formalism used by
a back-end prover. The diagnostic messages provided by
the back-end tool are then (partially) reverse engineered
to provide diagnostic output messages to the user. Each
failure can optionally be accompanied by the full details
provided by the underlying verification engine.
2.3.1 Tool Architecture
The VerCors tool set is built along the classical pattern
of a compiler. That is, the input programs are parsed into
an abstract syntax tree on which several transformations
are applied before they are passed on to one of the back-
ends. The arrows in Fig. 1 indicate the possible paths
a problem can take from input to solver. They reflect
that Chalice works by translating its input into Boogie
and Boogie in turn works by generating a problem for
an SMT solver, such as Z3 [11]. The direct arrows from
the intermediate format (Common Object Language) to
Chalice and Boogie indicate that (depending on the pre-
cise verification task) the tool will transform programs
into input programs for Chalice, or for Boogie directly.
In this paper, we only consider the encoding via Chalice.
2.3.2 Supported Specification Language
An important goal of the VerCors project is to build a
user-friendly tool for verifying realistic Java programs.
Therefore, we have derived the concrete syntax for our
separation logic from the syntax of JML, the de facto
standard for writing specifications for Java programs
[28]. This will allow us to reuse much of the experience
and research on specification writing, and in addition it
will allow users to extend JML specifications with con-
currency details, rather than having to write these spec-
ifications from scratch.
The tool considers two classes of expressions: resource
expressions (R, typical element ri) and logical expres-
sions (E, typical elements ei). An important subset of
those are the logical expressions of type boolean (B, typ-
ical elements bi). Using those classes, the syntax for the
formulas that is supported by the tool is defined as fol-
lows:
R ::= b | Perm(e.f, frac) | (\forall∗ T v; b; r)
| r1 ∗∗ r2 | r1 −∗ r2 | b1 ==> r2
| e.P(e1, · · · , en) | S(e1, · · · , em)
E ::= any pure expression
B ::= any pure expression of type boolean
| (\forall T v; b1; b2)
| (\exists T v; b1; b2)
where T is an arbitrary type, f a field name, frac a frac-
tion of a permission, v a variable name, P a (dynamic)
predicate and S a static predicate. Notice the correspon-
dence with the mathematical formulation of resource
logic in Section 2.1.
Note that we include both static predicates, which are
defined independently of object instances, and dynamic
predicates, whose definition is tied in with an instance of
an object (passed as an implicit argument).
The notation for implication ==> is borrowed from
JML, as are the notations for universal and existential
quantification (using keywords \forall and \exists, respec-
tively). VerCors uses (\forall∗ T v; b; r) to define the uni-
versal separating conjunction.
In addition to Java’s standard primitive types, the
specification language has two additional primitive types:
resource and frac, to type permission and fraction ex-
pressions, respectively. As in Chalice, the domain of frac
is a value between 1 and 100, where 100 means a full
write permission and any value less than 100 denotes a
read-only permission. This restriction is made because
we use Chalice as a back-end, not because the encoding
requires it. In principle the techniques described in this
paper work over any separation algebra [10].
Note that the syntax for resource formulas does not
allow disjunction or negation, except for the special case
of a boolean expression acting as a guard for a resource
formula. This restriction does not apply to the boolean
expressions, which can be used as part of a resource for-
mula.
It may seem that this contradicts our earlier claim of
extending JML, where disjunction is used heavily in or-
der to choose between possible contracts. However, this
does not introduce a real contradiction, as any method
with multiple contracts can be respecified with a single
contract, using an additional ghost parameter.
Like in JML, all comments that start with a @ are
part of the specification. This holds for both single line
(//@ ...) and multiple-line (/∗@ ... ∗/) comments.
Predicates are written in a simple functional syntax,
preceded by the keyword resource. For example, a pred-
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icate p providing write access to the field f is written as
follows:
/∗@ resource p()=Perm(f,100); ∗/
To indicate that a method is pure, as in JML, we add
a pure modifier to the method declaration.
/∗@ pure ∗/ boolean m(){
2 return true;
}
In JML, a method is said to be pure when all the
allocated objects on the heap in the prestate are not
changed in the poststate. However, our notion of pure
is even stricter: a pure expression cannot have any side-
effects.
Alternatively, if the method is used in specifications
only, the tool also allows to write this in a notation that
resembles the predicate syntax:
/∗@ boolean m()=true; ∗/
In method contracts, we will often employ ghost pa-
rameters and ghost return values. These are declared by
given and yields clauses that precede the method decla-
ration. For example, an integer ghost parameter x and a
boolean ghost return value b are specified as:
given int x;
yields boolean b;
Implicitly, a method contract is universally quantified
by the variables in the given clause, and existentially
quantified by the variables in the yields clause.
For specification convenience, the tool also provides a
polymorphic list or sequence type seq<T>, where T can
be any type (not necessarily a class). This type trans-
lates directly to the Chalice type of the same name. The
syntax for a constant list borrows from the syntax for a
constant array, e.g., the list [1,2,3] is written as
seq<int>{1,2,3}
Several standard operations on sequences are available.
Given sequences s,t, we have:
– concatenation: s + t;
– first element: head(s);
– other elements: tail(s); and
– length: s.length.
Further, we provide syntactic sugar for the following
common specification pattern:
(e != null) ==> e.pred(e1, · · · ,en)
which we abbreviate as:
e−>pred(e1, · · · ,en)
Finally, the tool implements inheritance using the
theory of abstract predicates and inheritance by Bier-
man and Parkinson [36], but cannot use the full power
of that theory because specifications are restricted to
monotone predicate families, as introduced by Haack
and Hurlin [16,23]. We will not discuss the details of
inheritance, because those are not needed for this paper.
In the examples below, whenever necessary we will
explain more details of the specification syntax.
3 The Tree Delete Challenge
As a motivating example for our work, we use the it-
erative removal of the element with the least key from
a binary search tree, i.e., Challenge 3 from the Veri-
fyThis@FM2012 Program Verification Competition [22]:
Given: a pointer t to the root of a non-empty bi-
nary search tree (not necessarily balanced). Verify
that the following procedure [in Fig. 3] removes
the node with the minimal key from the tree. Af-
ter removal, the data structure should again be a
binary search tree.
Input for the tree delete algorithm is a binary search
tree, in our case defined by the following (recursive) class
definition:
public class Tree {
2 public int data;
public Tree left;
4 public Tree right;
//...
6 }
The goal of the algorithm is to delete the element
with the smallest key, i.e., the left-most node from the
tree, and the challenge is to prove that the resulting tree
remains a binary search tree.
To provide a specification for the algorithm, we first
define:
– the predicate state, representing permissions to the
field locations making up the tree;
– the pure function contents, capturing the list of inte-
gers stored in the tree; and
– the predicate state contents, expressing the permis-
sions and the stored values simultaneously.
resource state() =
2 Perm(data,100) ∗∗
Perm(left,100) ∗∗ left −>state() ∗∗
4 Perm(right,100) ∗∗ right−>state();
6 requires t!=null ==> t.state();
pure seq<int> contents(Tree t){
8 if(t == null){
return seq<int>{};
10 } else {
unfold t.state();
12 return contents(t.left)
+ seq<int>{t.data}
14 + contents(t.right);
}
16
resource state contents(seq<int> L) =
18 state() ∗∗ contents(this) == L;
The state predicate defines the permissions on the
tree. If one holds the state predicate, one has write per-
mission on the fields data, left and right, and recursively
also on the subtrees pointed to by left and right, provided
they are not null. The pure method contents defines the
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public Tree del min(Tree t){
2 //@ unfold t.state();
if (t.left==null) {
4 //@ assert contents(t.left)
//@ == new seq<int>{};
6 return t.right;
} else {
8 t.left=del min(t.left);
//@ fold t.state();
10 return t;
}
12 }
Fig. 2. The recursive implementation of tree delete
contents of a tree to be the contents of the nodes’ data
fields, read from left to right.
Using these specifications, the method del min, which
implements the deletion of the element with the minimal
key is specified as follows.
/∗@
2 requires t!=null ∗∗ t.state();
ensures \result−>state();
4 ensures contents(\result)==
tail(\old(contents(t)));
6 @∗/
public Tree del min(Tree t);
This contract states that the algorithm removes the
first element of the list that is represented by a tree. As
the element with the minimal key in a binary search tree
is the first element of the list representation of the tree,
this contract is sufficient to meet the challenge. The per-
missions used are full write permissions, which implies
that the underlying linked data structure is tree-shaped,
and it cannot be a DAG or contain cycles. The con-
tents of the result are the contents of the input, minus
the first element, which implies that the result tree is
again a binary search tree. Note that the result is even
slightly stronger than required. According to the chal-
lenge it would have been acceptable to require that the
contents are ordered, but due to the way in which the
contract is written, this information is not needed.
Figure 2 contains a recursive implementation of this
algorithm. It is easy to see, and to verify, that this im-
plementation respects the specification of del min. To il-
lustrate this, we have decorated this recursive imple-
mentation with the annotations that are needed for the
VerCors tool to verify that this implementation respects
the specification above: essentially all that is needed are
opening of the state predicate at the beginning of the
method, closing of the state predicate at the end of the
method body, and an explicit assertion that if t.left is
null then the contents of t.left are the empty list.
In contrast to the recursive version, the verification
of the iterative version of this algorithm, as requested by
the actual challenge description, is much more involved.
One needs to specify an appropriate loop invariant that
retains all permissions on the entire tree data structure
during the iterations that compute the left-most node
in the tree. The invariant must be written in such a
way that the deletion of the left-most node afterwards is
allowed and that the permissions on the whole tree can
be recovered.
The core of the problem is the treatment of permis-
sions, which are given in the form of a tree. In each
iteration the focus on the tree (i.e. the variable current)
is shifted by one step. However, once you have reached
the left-most node, you want to move back the focus to
the root of the tree, i.e., after the loop has finished, the
method should continue with access to the root of the
tree. The magic wand is highly suited to handle this:
all the permissions on the traversed path are stored “in-
side” the magic wand, and by giving up the focus on the
current node, focus on the root can be retrieved. Notice
that our solution with the magic wand is general: it can-
not only be used to specify the shift of focus to the root
of the tree, but also to other nodes in the tree.
Fig. 3 contains the iterative implementation of the
tree delete algorithm, with the key loop invariants neces-
sary to verify this method1. Note that rather than using
the competition version verbatim, we have eliminated a
superfluous variable and renamed all variables in order
to make the code more understandable. Also note that
while our ultimate goal is to further develop the tool set
in such a way that this code can be verified essentially
as it is written in Fig. 3, the current version of our tool
set needs a lot more annotations. The fully annotated
version, which can actually be verified with the VerCors
tool set, will be given later in Section 6.1.
The variables in the algorithm denote the following:
– top is the pointer to the root of the complete tree;
– cur is the currently explored node; and
– left is the left subtree of cur.
The loop invariant expresses the following:
– the thread holds permissions for the currently ex-
plored node (state predicate);
– the currently explored node is the root of a tree (state
predicate);
– the relationship between cur and left is as described
above; and
– a promise (by means of a magic wand) that if cur is
modified to represent a tree with the left-most ele-
ment removed, and if the thread holds access per-
missions to this tree, then this can be exchanged to
access permissions on a larger tree, which also has
the left-most element removed compared to the tree
at the start of the procedure.
1 For clarity of presentation, we have left out one bookkeeping
invariant and a lot of proof script.
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Tree del min (Tree top) {
2 if (top.left == NULL) {
return top.right;
4 } else {
Tree cur = top;
6 Tree left = cur.left;
8 loop invariant cur.state();
loop invariant cur.left==left;
10 loop invariant wand:
cur.state contents(tail(contents(cur)))
12 −∗ top.state contents(tail(top));
while (left.left != NULL) {
14 cur = left;
left= cur.left;
16 }
cur.left = left.left;
18 apply wand;
return top;
20 }
}
Fig. 3. The iterative implementation of tree delete
With this loop invariant, we can correctly capture
sufficient “promises” about the rest of the data struc-
ture, in order to verify correctness of the algorithm.
To make this proof amenable to automated tool sup-
port, we need an encoding of the magic wand formula
using classes, separating conjunction and the points-to
predicate. To be able to do this encoding, the user has
to provide some evidence that the magic wand is in-
deed correct, i.e., that the required resources can indeed
by exchanged for the promised resources. We introduce
this encoding in two steps. First, we introduce the ba-
sic idea behind encoding formulas as objects using the
witness encoding of predicates with parameters. Second,
we show how magic wands can be encoded in a similar
style. Finally, we show how we can use this approach to
complete the verification of the tree delete challenge.
4 The Encoding of Predicates
This section shows how predicates with explicit param-
eters, different from the implicit this parameter, are en-
coded in Chalice. Below, we first discuss how some pred-
icates can be split in a data part and a resource part.
However, there are many predicates for which this ap-
proach does not work. Therefore, we propose an alterna-
tive approach, encoding a predicate with parameters as
a witness object. We describe this approach first for sim-
ple predicates, and then for recursive predicates. Finally,
we describe the encoding algorithm.
4.1 Splittable Predicates
To provide the intuition behind our approach, we first
discuss the most simple case, where it is easy to separate
a predicate into a permission and a data part.
For example, suppose we have a predicate on a linked
list expressing that one has write access to the list and
that the list contains a given sequence of elements. A
common way to define this in separation logic is as fol-
lows:
class List {
2 int val;
List next;
4
resource list(List l,seq<int>L)=
6 (l==null)?(L==seq<int>{}):
( Perm(l.val,100) ∗∗ Perm(l.next,100)
8 ∗∗ L.length>0 ∗∗ l.val==head(L)
∗∗ list(l.next,tail(L)));
10
}
Obviously, since Chalice does not support predicates with
parameters, this cannot be directly encoded in Chalice.
However, it is straightforward to see that this recursive
predicate can be split into a permission part, a value
part and a non-recursive predicate, each with the same
control flow. Notice that non-recursive predicates can al-
ways be inlined, so they do not provide any difficulties
for verification, however they are very useful for clarity
of specifications.
resource state()=
2 Perm(val,100) ∗∗
Perm(next,100) ∗∗ next−>state();
4
requires l−>state();
6 pure boolean contains(List l,seq<int> L)=
(l==null)?(L==seq<int>{}):(L.length>0 &&
8 l.val==head(L) && contains(l.next,tail(L)));
10 resource list(List l,seq<int> L)=
l−>state() ∗∗ contains(l,L);
Note that after splitting, the resource part of the orig-
inal list predicate is written as a recursive predicate state
that no longer has a parameter, and thus it can be en-
coded directly in Chalice. The data part of the original
list predicate is captured by the recursive pure method
contains, which still has a parameter. However, this is no
problem, as this can be encoded directly as a Chalice
function. Finally, there is a non-recursive predicate list,
which has parameters, but those are easy to eliminate
in the encoding: simply inline the definition throughout
the specification.
4.2 Predicate Witnesses
It is not always possible to split a predicate into a per-
mission part without parameters and a data part. For
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class List {
2 int val;
List next;
4 /∗@
resource state(frac p,frac q)
6 = Perm(val,p)
∗∗ Perm(next,q)
8 ∗∗ rec:next−>state(p,q);
∗/
10 }
Fig. 4. Recursive state predicate with permission parameters
VerCors
public class Twice {
2 //@ resource state(frac p)=true;
4 /∗@ given frac p;
requires state(p);
6 ensures state(p); ∗/
void m(){};
8
/∗@ given frac q;
10 requires state(q);
ensures state(q); ∗/
12 void twice(){
m();
14 m();
}
16 }
Fig. 5. Class Twice
example, suppose you wish to define a predicate that
captures that you have fraction p to access the elements
stored in the list (via the val pointer), and fraction q to
traverse the next pointer to the next element in the list,
as is done in Figure 4. For this predicate, the split as
described above is impossible. To get around this prob-
lem, we introduce the notion of witness. This witness is
a carefully encoded object, containing a valid predicate,
which holds for the witness object if and only if the orig-
inal predicate holds.
4.2.1 Witnesses for Non-Recursive Predicates
To describe how this witness object is constructed and
reasoned about, we first consider the encoding of a very
simple predicate, whose body is just true. Class Twice in
Fig. 5 defines such a predicate, called state.
Fig. 6 shows the definition of the witness object in
Chalice that encodes the state predicate declared in class
Twice. The witness object is an instance of class Twice state.
This class definition is generated by the VerCors tool set.
The class has two fields: ref refers to the object where the
original predicate is defined, and p holds the value of the
Chalice
class Twice state {
2 var ref : Twice;
var p : int;
4
predicate valid
6 {
acc(this.p,100) && acc(this.ref,100) &&
8 this.ref!=null && 0<this.p && this.p<=100
&& true
10 }
12 function check(object: Twice,p: int):bool
requires this.valid;
14 ensures true;
{
16 unfolding this.valid in
this.ref==object && this.p==p
18 }
20 function get ref():Twice
requires this.valid;
22 ensures true;
{
24 unfolding this.valid in this.ref
}
26
function get p():int
28 requires this.valid;
ensures true;
30 {
unfolding this.valid in this.p
32 }
}
Fig. 6. Chalice encoding of the witness class Twice state
parameter p. Further, it defines a predicate valid that
encodes the original state predicate, but using the fields
of the witness object, instead of the original predicate’s
parameters. In addition, the class contains a function
check that relates the predicate parameters in the origi-
nal specification to the fields of the witness object, and
requires them to be the same. If o is the witness ob-
ject for a predicate state, then an assertion this.state(p)
becomes essentially o.valid() ? o.check(this,p) in the en-
coding (see for example Lines 4, 5 and 10, 11 in Fig. 8).
To complete the description of the class Twice state, it
also defines getter methods for all fields in the class.
Using the witness object of the predicate, we wish to
show that class Twice in Figure 5 is correct. For a human,
is easy to see that the body of twice satisfies its contract:
the pre- and postconditions of m and twice are all the
same, and the calls to m thus can be put in sequence.
To ensure that the tool can establish the correctness
of twice, we need to decorate it with some additional
proof annotations, as shown in Fig. 7. First of all, ev-
ery usage of predicate state has been prefixed with a
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public class Twice {
2 //@ resource state(frac p)=true;
4 /∗@ given frac p;
requires in1:state(p);
6 ensures out1:state(p); ∗/
void m(){ /∗@ out1=in1; ∗/};
8
/∗@ given frac q;
10 requires in2:state(q);
ensures out2:state(q); ∗/
12 void twice(){
m() /∗@ label call1
14 with { p=q; in1=in2; } ∗/ ;
m() /∗@ label call2
16 with { p=q; in1=call1.out1; } ∗/ ;
/∗@ out2=call2.out1; ∗/
18 }
}
Fig. 7. Class Twice
label, which refers to a witness (an instance of the class
Twice state after encoding). Thus, for example in1 is used
to refer to the witness object for predicate state that is
passed as argument to the call of m, while out1 is used
to refer to the witness object for the predicate returned
by this call. Also the method invocations have been an-
notated with a label (syntax: label name), and with a
block to instantiate the ghost parameters of the method
(syntax: with block). The label can be used to refer to
the invocation, and to its return values later. Thus for
example, call1 labels the first call to m. The with block
instantiates the variables declared in the given block for
the method (in this case frac p), and the witness object
associated with the precondition of this call.
Finally, Fig. 8 shows the encoding of class Twice in
Chalice. Notice how the state predicate is encoded as a
combination of valid and check. The information from the
with block is used to generate parameters for the Chalice
method calls.
4.2.2 Witnesses for Recursive Predicates
When a predicate is recursively defined, such as the state
predicate on linked lists in Fig. 4, the witness encoding
does not result in a single object, but in a tree of witness
objects. For every recursive invocation of the predicate
in the predicate definition, the witness contains a field
that refers to the witness that provides the evidence for
the recursive call. Thus, the witness for a predicate be-
ing valid on an object is actually a tree of witness ob-
jects, whose structure matches the calling structure of
the evaluation of the original predicate. For example, in
Fig. 9, the linked list of witnesses at the top reflects that
the definition of rec:state(p,q) applied to the list of three
Chalice
class Twice {
2 method m(p: int,in1: Twice state)
returns (out1: Twice state)
4 requires in1!=null&&in1.valid &&in1.check(this,p);
ensures out1!=null&&out1.valid&&out1.check(this,p);
6 { out1 := in1; }
8 method twice(q: int,in2: Twice state)
returns (out2: Twice state)
10 requires in2!=null&&in2.valid &&in2.check(this,q);
ensures out2!=null&&out2.valid&&out2.check(this,q);
12 {
call call1 out1 := this.m(q,in2);
14 call call2 out1 := this.m(q,call1 out1);
out2 := call2 out1;
16 }
}
Fig. 8. Chalice encoding of class Twice
witness to lst.state():
list object lst:
ref ref ref
next nextnextval val val
p qqqp
rec rec rec
p
Fig. 9. Example witness structure for linked list
elements at the bottom makes two recursive calls. The
definition of the witness object is given in Fig. 10, where
the field rec refers to the witness object for the recursive
call of the predicate. Note further how the conditional
part of the valid predicate in lines 17-19, matches the
conditional invocation rec:next−>state(p,q) in the origi-
nal predicate definition.
4.3 Recipe for the Encoding
As presented above, the encoding into Chalice generates
a witness class for every predicate definition, replaces
predicate invocations in logical statements by validity
checks on witnesses, and adds getter methods for use by
witness classes as well as variables that are needed to
store witness objects.
The complete recipe for the encoding is as follows:
1. Every predicate definition
resource pred(type1 arg1,...,typeN argN) = body ;
declared inside class Class, gives rise to the declara-
tion of a sibling of Class, called Class pred, containing:
– a field Class ref, to refer to the object for which
the validity of the original predicate is encoded;
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class List state {
2 var ref : List;
var p : int;
4 var q : int;
var rec : List state;
6 predicate valid
{
8 acc(this.rec,100)
&& acc(this.q,100)
10 && acc(this.p,100)
&& acc(this.ref,100)
12 && this.ref!=null
&& 0<this.p && this.p<=100
14 && 0<this.q && this.q<=100
&& acc(this.ref.val,this.p)
16 && acc(this.ref.next,this.q)
&& ( this.ref.next!=null==>
18 this.rec!=null && this.rec.valid &&
this.rec.check(this.ref.next,this.p,this.q)
20 }
function check(object: List,p: int,q: int):bool
22 requires this.valid;
ensures true;
24 {
unfolding this.valid in
26 this.ref==object&&this.p==p&&this.q==q
}
Fig. 10. Fragment of the List state witness encoding
– fields type1 arg1, . . . , typeN argN, to store the pa-
rameters of the original predicate;
– a predicate valid, whose definition is the separat-
ing conjunction of write access to the fields of the
predicate class and the translation of the body of
pred;
– a function check(Class ref,type1 arg1, ..., typeN argN)
that can validate if the reference and parameters
match; and
– getter methods for all fields.
2. In the method specifications and other annotations,
every predicate invocation name:field.pred(args) is re-
placed by the following separating conjunction:
name!=null ∗∗ name.valid ∗∗ name.check(field,args)
This encoding depends on name being defined, there-
fore some additional declarations are necessary, de-
pending on where the invocation occurred:
– in a requires clause: add a parameter
Class pred name to the given clause;
– in an ensures clause: add a return value
Class pred name to the yields clause; or
– in the body of a predicate definition: add a field
Class pred name to the definition of Class pred and
also add Perm(name,100) to the valid predicate of
the class Class pred.
3. The original class is modified as follows:
– the predicate definition is removed;
– every occurrence of
unfold name:obj.pred(expr1,...,exprN)
is replaced by unfold name.valid; and
– every occurrence of
fold name:obj.pred(expr1,...,exprN);
is replaced by the block
{
name = new Class pred();
name.ref = obj;
name.arg1 = expr1;
...
name.argN = exprN;
fold name.valid;
}
5 The Encoding of Magic Wands
Now that we have seen how predicates with parameters
are encoded in Chalice using witness objects, we discuss
how magic wands are encoded. The syntax that was used
above, labeling calls and uses of predicates, and provid-
ing explicit instantiations for the ghost arguments, will
also be used in this section. Additionally, we introduce
new syntax to create a magic wand and to apply it. The
creation of a magic wand requires the user to provide a
proof script. The proof script language will be discussed
below.
5.1 General Idea
The general idea behind our encoding is as follows: each
magic wand formula is encoded as an instance of class
Wand. Assuming that we have a type that can represent
formulas, the formulas describing the required and en-
sured resources of the magic wand are fields of this class.
In addition, the class contains a description of how the
required resources can be exchanged for the ensured re-
sources (encoded in the method apply2) and of the extra
resources needed to do so. These extra resources are in-
haled by the constructor, and not returned. Instead they
are stored inside the magic wand object (in the extra
field), and folded into the valid predicate. The executing
thread cannot directly access these extra resources any
more, the only way to retrieve them is by using the apply
method. The specification of the apply method requires
the required formula of the magic wand and ensures the
ensured formula, while its body is the exchange descrip-
tion. In addition, the apply method also requires the
valid predicate, for two reasons: first, this prevents the
apply method from being called more than once; and
second, this allows the apply method to retrieve the ex-
tra resources needed for the conversion. Correctness of
the apply method w.r.t. its specification ensures that the
resources stored in the wand, together with the required
2 We use apply as the method name because we are going to
use apply as a keyword.
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class Wand {
2 Formula f1;
Formula f2;
4 Formula extra;
Proof p;
6
resource valid()=extra();
8
requires extra();
10 ensures this.f1 == f1 && this.f2 == f2;
ensures this.p == p && this.extra==extra;
12 ensures valid();
Wand(Formula f1, Formula f2,
14 Formula extra, Proof p)
{
16 this.f1 = f1;
this.f2 = f2;
18 this.extra = extra;
this.p = p;
20 fold valid();
}
22
requires valid() ∗∗ f1();
24 ensures f2();
void apply() {
26 unfold valid();
p();
28 }
}
Fig. 11. Idealised wand encoding
resources are sufficient to establish the ensured resources
of the magic wand. Figure 11 shows the definition of this
wand class.
Notice that this is not a valid encoding, as it uses
types such as Formula and Proof, which are not supported.
Therefore, below we discuss how the ideas of this ide-
alised encoding can be realised by a correct Chalice class.
5.2 Encoding of Magic Wands in Chalice
This section discusses how the idea described above is
used to generate a specific class for each type of wand
formula that is used. Moreover, the proof script cannot
be passed as a parameter, instead we encode it by an
identifier, and generate a body of apply that selects the
appropriate proof script, depending on the value of the
identifier.
Consider for example the WandDemo class in Fig. 12.
This class implements a field x, and setter and getter
methods for that field. The contracts are written to en-
force a non-standard set/get protocol3, which was in-
spired by the iterator protocol of Hurlin and Haack [17].
3 We chose this protocol for illustrative purposes; not because
of its practical value. However, more meaningful protocols can be
treated in a similar way, as shown in Section 6.2.
VerCors
class WandDemo {
2 int x;
4 /∗@
resource readonly()=Perm(x,25);
6 resource writeonly()=Perm(x,100);
@∗/
8
//@ requires readonly();
10 /∗@ pure ∗/ int get()=this.x;
12 //@ ensures writeonly();
WandDemo(){
14 //@ fold writeonly();
}
16
/∗@
18 requires writeonly();
ensures readonly();
20 ensures recover:(readonly()−∗writeonly());
@∗/
22 void set(int v){
//@ unfold writeonly();
24 x=v;
//@ fold readonly();
26 /∗@
create {
28 unfold readonly();
use Perm(this.x,75);
30 fold writeonly();
qed recover:(readonly()−∗writeonly());
32 }
@∗/
34 }
36 void demo(){
//@ witness wand:(readonly()−∗writeonly());
38 WandDemo d=new WandDemo();
int i=1;
40 //@ loop invariant d.writeonly();
while(true){
42 set call:d.set(i);
//@ wand=set call.recover;
44 i=d.get()+d.get();
//@ apply wand:(readonly()−∗writeonly());
46 }
}
48 }
Fig. 12. Class WandDemo
Every WandDemo object can be in two states: read mode
and write mode. When an instance is created, it is cre-
ated in write mode. In write mode, the only method that
can be called is set. After setting, the object is in read
mode. In read mode, the only method that can be called
is get, and the object stays in read mode. However, it is
always possible to reset the object to a different value.
Stefan Blom and Marieke Huisman: Witnessing the Elimination of Magic Wands 13
To do so, write mode must be reestablished. Hence, the
set method ensures not just the predicate readonly(), but
in addition also the magic wand readonly()−∗writeonly(),
which can be applied to enable writing. Figure 12 also
defines a method demo to illustrate how the magic wand
is used.
The code is mostly self-explanatory, but three ele-
ments are worth noting:
– Every magic wand is given a label, which is used to
be able to identify which magic wand is addressed.
In this example, labels recover and wand are used.
– The syntax for creating a magic wand is
create {
proof script
qed wand formula;
}
To write the proof script, the usual proof hints (fold/
unfold/etc.) are allowed, and additionally two new
statements are introduced: use R; and qed R;. The
use statement asserts that formula R holds at the
time the magic wand is created and stores the re-
sources represented by this formula inside the magic
wand. For example, the proof in lines 27-32 stores
75% of the permission on the field x by means of
the statement use Perm(this.x,75). The qed statement
ends the proof script for the magic wand.
– In the demo method, the witness keyword in line 37
is used to indicate that the label wand refers to a
witness for the corresponding magic wand formula.
Our encoding declares a class for the witness object,
called Wand readonly for writeonly, as shown in Fig. 13,
to represent the magic wand. Moreover, it rewrites the
WandDemo class to replace magic wand formulas by ma-
nipulations of the witness object (see Fig. 14).
Instances of Wand readonly for writeonly are used as wit-
nesses to the validity of all magic wands that match
e1.readonly() −∗ e2.writeonly() for arbitrary expressions e1
and e2. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate which proof
is to be used by the apply method, by setting the lemma
field to the correct value. The results of evaluating the
expressions at the time when the wand was created is
stored in the fields in 1 and out 1, which have matching
getter methods. Variables that are used in the proof are
also stored in the object. In this case the value of this for
lemma 1 is the only value needed and it is stored in the
field this 1.
The contract of the apply method essentially requires
the wand to be valid, and the the readonly predicate on
in 1 to hold. It ensures the writeonly predicate on out 1.
The actual code uses getters and has to deal with non-
nullness and temporal issues as well.
The body of the apply method consists of an unfold
statement, followed by a case distinction over the proofs
that have to be verified. For each proof, the proof hints
are copied into the corresponding branch in the apply
method. In order to get error messages to point to the
intermediate VerCors
class Wand readonly for writeonly
2 {
int lemma;
4
WandDemo in 1;
6 /∗@
requires this.valid();
8 ensures true;
@∗/
10 WandDemo get in 1()=in 1;
12 WandDemo out 1;
/∗@
14 requires this.valid();
ensures true;
16 @∗/
WandDemo get out 1()=out 1;
18
/∗@
20 requires this.valid()∗∗get in 1()!=null
∗∗get in 1().readonly()∗∗get out 1()!=null;
22 ensures \old(get out 1()).writeonly();
@∗/
24 void apply(){
//@ unfold this.valid();
26 if (lemma==1){
//@ unfold this 1.readonly();
28 //@ fold this 1.writeonly();
assert true∗∗out 1.writeonly();
30 }
}
32
WandDemo this 1;
34 /∗@
predicate boolean valid()=Perm(lemma,100)
36 ∗∗lemma>0∗∗Perm(in 1,100)∗∗Perm(out 1,100)
∗∗Perm(this 1,100)
38 ∗∗( lemma==1==>
this 1!=null∗∗Perm(this 1.x,75)∗∗
40 in 1==this 1∗∗out 1==this 1)
∗∗lemma<=1;
42 ∗/
44 /∗@
requires true;
46 ensures PointsTo(lemma,100,0)∗∗PointsTo(in 1,100,null)
∗∗PointsTo(out 1,100,null)∗∗PointsTo(this 1,100,null);
48 @∗/
Wand readonly for writeonly(){
50 lemma=0;
in 1=null;
52 out 1=null;
this 1=null;
54 }
}
Fig. 13. Encoding of the wand formula in class WandDemo
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correct place, an assert statement is added, which in case
of a bad proof will trigger error messages for the specific
proof, rather than for the apply method in general.
The valid predicate specifies (write) access to all fields
in the object and for every proof it has a conditional re-
quirement that all of the required permissions and prop-
erties are valid. For our example this means that for ex-
ample if lemma is 1 then we have 75% permission on
this 1.x and this 1 == in 1 == out 1. Finally, the predi-
cate valid also states that lemma must contain a valid
proof number.
In Java, the logical way of creating new witness ob-
jects is to have an overloaded constructor for every proof
script. That is not possible in Chalice, so instead we
generate a factory method with a unique name for ev-
ery proof script. These methods are placed in the class
that calls them. Thus, in our case, the factory method
Wand readonly for writeonly lemma 1, which requires the per-
missions and properties used in the proof and ensures a
magic wand witness, is put into the WandDemo class.
We do not include a full listing of the generated Chal-
ice code; however it can be generated using the online
version of the VerCors tool set4.
5.3 Correctness of the Encoding
This sections aims to provide an intuition why our en-
coding is correct. We will do so based on the view that a
static verifier is a tool that, given a program with specifi-
cations establishes the existance of a correctness proof of
those specifications. For example, for a sequential pro-
gram it would establish the existence of a Hoare logic
proof. Therefore, we will show that the program before
the witness transformation can be proven correct if and
only if the program after the witness transformation can
be proven correct.
In order to avoid unnecessary clutter, we will ignore
scoping and visibility rules rules for variables, as it is
well-known how to fix these issues. Moreover, we will
focus on the places where magic wands are introduced
and eliminated. In proofs, magic wands can also occur
in many other places, as they are carried along in proofs
and specifications. However, as long as a magic wand
is not introduced or eliminated, it is no different from
any other formula and thus irrelevant for showing the
correctness of the encoding.
The existence of proofs in a proof system is denoted
with the symbol `. That is,
F1, · · · , Fn ` G
denotes that there is a proof that G logically follows from
F1 ? · · · ? Fn. The classical introduction and elimination
rules for magic wands are the following [17]:
F,G1 ` G2
(I −? )
F ` G1 −? G2
4 http://fmt.ewi.utwente.nl/puptol/vercors-verifier/.
intermediate VerCors
class WandDemo
2 {
int x;
4
/∗@ resource readonly()=Perm(x,25); ∗/
6
/∗@ resource writeonly()=Perm(x,100); ∗/
8
/∗@ requires this.readonly();
10 ensures true; @∗/
int get()=this.x;
12
/∗@ requires true;
14 ensures this.writeonly(); @∗/
WandDemo(){
16 //@ fold this.writeonly();
}
18
/∗@ requires this 1!=null ∗∗ Perm(this 1.x,75)
20 ∗∗in 1!=null∗∗in 1==this 1
∗∗out 1!=null∗∗out 1==this 1;
22 ensures \result!=null ∗∗ \result.valid()
∗∗ \result.get in 1()==in 1
24 ∗∗ \result.get out 1()==out 1; @∗/
Wand readonly for writeonly
26 Wand readonly for writeonly lemma 1
(WandDemo this 1,WandDemo in 1,WandDemo out 1){
28 Wand readonly for writeonly wand=
new Wand readonly for writeonly();
30 wand.lemma=1;
wand.this 1=this 1;
32 wand.in 1=in 1;
wand.out 1=out 1;
34 //@ fold wand.valid();
return wand;
36 }
38 /∗@ yields Wand readonly for writeonly wand;
requires this.writeonly();
40 ensures this.readonly() ∗∗ wand!=null∗∗wand.valid()
∗∗wand.get in 1()==this∗∗wand.get out 1()==this;
42 @∗/
void set(int v){
44 //@ unfold this.writeonly();
x=v;
46 //@ fold this.readonly();
wand=Wand readonly for writeonly lemma 1(this,this,this);
48 }
50 /∗@ given Wand readonly for writeonly wand;
requires this.readonly() ∗∗ wand!=null∗∗wand.valid()
52 ∗∗wand.get in 1()==this∗∗wand.get out 1()==this;
ensures this.writeonly(); @∗/
54 void done(){
wand.apply();
56 }
}
Fig. 14. Class WandDemo after introducing witness objects.
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F1 ` G1 −? G2 F2 ` G1
(E −? )
F1, F2 ` G2
These rules are used in low level proofs to show that
one claim logically follows from the previous one. We
will show that a proof that uses these two rules can be
transformed into a proof that does not use them. Hence,
we consider the following two fragments that use the
rules:
{H ? F}
// because F ` G1 −? G2
{H ? (G1 −? G2)}
and
{H ? G1 ? (G1 −? G2)}
// by application of E −?
{H ? G2}
We show that we can eliminate the magic wand for-
mulas from these fragments by transforming them into
magic wand free equivalents. As a first step, we lift the
proof script and the application of the magic wand for-
mula from the fragments into a separate class Wand:
Wand { // version 1
2 resource valid()=G1 −? G2;
requires F ;
4 ensures valid();
Wand(){
6 {F}
// because F ` G1 −? G2
8 {G1 −? G2}
fold valid();
10 {valid()}
}
12 requires G1 ? valid();
ensures G2;
14 void apply(){
{G1 ? valid()}
16 unfold valid();
{G1 ? (G1 −? G2)}
18 // by application of E −?
{G2}
20 }
}
Using this class the fragments can be rewritten to
{H ? F}
Wand witness=new Wand();
{H ? witness.valid()}
and
{H ? G1 ? witness.valid()}
witness. apply();
{H ? G2}
Instead of using a magic wand in the fragments directly,
we now have encapsulated the magic wand in the valid
predicate of the ghost class Wand. Note how the resources
needed to prove the magic wand (F2) are explicitly re-
quired in the contract of the constructor.
The reverse of this first step is inlining, which is
known to be correct, so this first step preserves correct-
ness of the annotated program.
All occurrences of the magic wand are now located in-
side the ghost class Wand, and in particular in the defini-
tion of the predicate valid. As a second step, we eliminate
the magic wand from the definition of valid, by moving
the proof of the magic wand from the constructor to the
apply method:
Wand { // version 2
2 resource valid()=F ;
requires F ;
4 ensures valid();
Wand(){
6 {F}
fold valid();
8 {valid()}
}
10 requires G1 ? valid();
ensures G2;
12 void apply(){
{G1 ? valid()}
14 unfold valid();
{G1 ? F}
16 // because F ` G1 −? G2
{G1 ? (G1 −? G2)}
18 // by application of E −?
{G2}
20 }
}
Clearly, since the specifications of the constructor
and method apply did not change compared to the en-
coding in version 1 of class Wand, any program proven
correct using the first Wand encoding, will also be proven
correct using the Wand version 2 encoding and vice versa.
Notice further that the correctness proofs of the con-
structor and the method apply in version 2 of class Wand
are correct if and only if they are correct in version 1 of
class Wand.
Finally, as a last step to get to the encoding that we
have actually presented above, we can use a cut elimina-
tion theorem from the underlying proof theory (similar
to [32]), and simplify the annotated body of the apply
method as follows:
{G1 ? valid()}
unfold valid();
{G1 ? F}
// because F, G1 ` G2
{G2}
This removes the last occurrence of the magic wand from
the annotated code.
We have sketched how a program before the witness
encoding can be proven correct if and only if the program
after the transformation can be proven correct. Thus the
witness transformation for magic wands is both sound
and complete.
For this correctness sketch, we have conveniently for-
gotten about visibility of fields and methods. However,
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class Wand P for Q {
2
−−→
Tpars pars
int lemma;
4
−→
T1 free
′
1
...
6
−→
TL free
′
L
8 resource valid()=
”read access to all fields”
10 ∗∗ 1 <= lemma ∗∗ lemma <= L
∗∗ (lemma==1 ==> extra ′1)
12
...
∗∗ (lemma==L ==> extra ′L) ;
14
for every field T f :
16 requires valid();
T get f()=f ;
18
requires valid();
20 requires P(get in 1(),· · · );
ensures Q(old(get out 1()),· · · );
22 void apply(){
unfold valid();
24 if (lemma==1) { script ′1 }
...
26 if (lemma==L) { script ′L }
}
28 }
Fig. 15. Template for a witness class
the actual implementation does take care of those. Sim-
ilarly the implementation takes care of multiple proofs
by having multiple factory methods instead of a single
constructor and by using a case distinction in the bodies
of the valid predicate and apply method, to distinguish
between the different proof resources and proofs.
5.4 Recipe for the Encoding
To conclude, we sketch the complete translation algo-
rithm from a program that has been annotated using
magic wands into a program that is annotated using
witnesses. This requires to translate all occurrences of
magic wand formulas and all occurrences of magic wand
proof scripts.
The implementation supports magic wand formulas
where both the required formula and the ensured for-
mula are a conjunction of predicate invocations. For this
presentation, we limit ourselves to a single required pred-
icate and a single ensured predicate. We can do this with-
out loss of generality because any formula can be turned
into a single predicate formula, where the predicate body
is the conjunction of the individual formulas and where
the parameters are the free variables in the formulas.
Thus, we assume magic wands of the form:
name : P(−→e ) −∗ Q(−→f )
For every magic wand formula that uses the same
combination of predicates, we use the same witness class,
whose template is given in Fig. 15. First we generate a
list of field declarations for the witness class, declaring
all the parameters used in the magic wand formula:
– for i = 1 · · · |−→e |: typeof (ei) in i;
– for i = 1 · · · |−→f |: typeof (fi) out i;
where typeof is a meta operator that extracts the type
of an expression.
Further, the witness class defines getters for all of its
fields. This allows us to replace the magic wand formula
name : P(−→e ) −∗ Q(−→f )
with a formula that states that name is a valid witness
of this formula:
name != null ∗∗ name.valid() ∗∗
|−→e |
*
i=1
name.get in i()==ei ∗∗
|−→f |
*
j=1
name.get out j()==fj
Note that the quantifiers in this formula have to
be expanded at code generation time because they use
mathematical meta-notation that is not part of our syn-
tax.
The annotated program will contain several proof
scripts to create a witness, all matching the following
template.
create {
script ;
qed name : P(−→e ) −∗ Q(−→f );
}
Let the total number of proof scripts be L, and let
the scripts be numbered 1, · · · , L.
For each script, we compute the list of free variables
used in the script and/or the wand formula
−−→
free, and
their types
−→
T , respectively. The list of free variables by
definition contains this. In order to avoid name clashes,
we prime all variable names, resulting in the list
−−→
free ′.
Each proof script is then replaced with a call to a factory
method, using an appropriate proof script identifier id to
generate a unique name, as defined in Fig. 16:
name = Wand ... create id(−−→pars,−−→free);
The given proof script script id is used to construct the
formula extra ′id and the proof script script
′
id, as follows:
– For every occurrence of use φ in script id, a conjunct
φ′ is added to extra ′id.
– Every other proof hint is renamed by priming all vari-
ables and then added to the proof script script ′id.
When turning magic wands into witnesses, witness
variables must be declared for each usage of the magic
wand formula.
– when used in requires, the variable is declared in the
given of this method;
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requires extra ′id
2 ensures \result!=null ∗∗ \result.valid();
ensures (\forall∗ f ∈ −−→pars,−−→free ′;
4 \result.get f()==f);
Wand ... create id(
−−−−−−→
Tpars pars,
−−−−→
T free ′){
6 Wand result=new Wand();
result.lemma=id;
8 for(f ∈ −−→pars,−−→free ′){
result.f = f;
10 }
fold valid();
12 return result;
}
Fig. 16. Factory method for a witness
– when used in ensures, the variable is declared in the
yields clause of this method; and
– when used in witness or loop invariant, the variable is
declared as a local variable.
Finally, every application of a magic wand
apply name : P(−→e ) −∗ Q(−→f );
is replaced by a call to the apply method of the witness:
name.apply();
This completes the description of the encoding as it
is implemented.
6 Magic Wand Examples
This section presents two more-involved examples that
use the magic wand in their annotations. First, we con-
sider the tree delete challenge. Second, we consider an
iterator protocol for iterators on a list of integers. For
both examples, we show how to provide full annotations,
so that it can be verified by the VerCors tool set.
6.1 Verification of the Tree Delete Challenge
Using the encoding, we can verify the tree delete chal-
lenge. Taking the annotated algorithm in Fig. 3 as a
starting point, we have to provide proof scripts whenever
we create a magic wand formula in order to make it ver-
ifiable. Since the magic wand formula is used in the loop
invariant (and a new instance of it is needed with every
iteration of the loop), we actually require witnesses for
the creation of magic wand objects in two places in the
annotated program: we need a witness to create a magic
wand formula to show that the loop invariant holds upon
loop initialisation, i.e., before the loop is actually exe-
cuted, and in addition we need to provide a witness to
create a magic wand formula inside the loop body, to
show that every iteration of the loop preserves the loop
ready readyForNext
hasNext()
remove() next()
readyForRemove
new
magic wand
method call
Fig. 18. State machine for the iterator protocol
invariant. Fig. 17 shows the resulting fully annotated
version of the tree delete algorithm.
The creation of the the magic wand formula in the
different annotations uses different witness proofs (see
Lines 25, and 38-48). However, the two different instances
are used both in the loop invariant, which shows that it
is essential to have a single apply method that can be
used in different proof scripts.
The online version of the VerCors tool set can be
used to inspect the full Chalice encoding of this example.
Using the Chalice encoding, the VerCors tool can verify
the iterative tree delete algorithm without any problems.
The entire example verifies in 6 minutes on an Intel i7-
2600 (3.40GHz).
6.2 The Iterator Protocol
As a second example, we present a variant of the iter-
ator protocol from Haack and Hurlin [17]. To simplify
our presentation, we have chosen to work with a list of
integers rather than a list of objects.
The iterator protocol uses the following three states:
ready, readyForNext and readyForRemove. The entire proto-
col is displayed in Fig. 18. When an iterator is created,
permissions on the current list are folded in the ready
state. In this state, one may apply a magic wand to re-
cover the permissions on the current list, or one may call
hasNext to test for the existence of a next element. If such
an element exists, the next state is readyForNext, other-
wise the next state is ready. If the state is readyForNext,
the next method can be used to retrieve the current
element and the next state will be readyForRemove. In
the readyForRemove state, one can use either the remove
method or the magic wand provided by next to go back
to the ready state.
The specifications of the integer list and the list itera-
tor can be found in Fig. 19 and 20, respectively. We have
annotated implementations of these interfaces, which have
been verified with the VerCors tool set. The fully anno-
tated versions are available from the same website as the
tree delete example.
We have also verified a small example that illustrates
the usage of the list and the iterator, see Fig. 21. In this
example, we create a list containing [−1, 0, 1] and then
use an iterator to remove the negative elements. The
entire example verifies in 19 seconds on an Intel i7-2600
(3.40GHz).
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//@ requires top!=null ∗∗ top.state();
2 //@ ensures contains(\result,tail(\old(top.contents())));
public Tree del min(Tree top){
4 //@ seq<int> orig contents=top.contents();
//@ seq<int> target contents=tail(top.contents());
6 //@ unfold top.state();
if (top.left == null) {
8 return top.right;
} else {
10 Tree cur, left;
cur = top;
12 left = top.left;
//@ seq<int> cur contents=orig contents;
14 //@ assert cur contents == left.contents() + seq<int>{top.data} + tolist(top.right);
//@ unfold left.state();
16 /∗@
loop invariant Perm(cur.left,100) ∗∗ Perm(cur.data,100) ∗∗ Perm(cur.right,100);
18 loop invariant cur.left==left ∗∗ cur.right−>state() ;
loop invariant Perm(left.left,100) ∗∗ Perm(left.data,100) ∗∗ Perm(left.right,100);
20 loop invariant left.left−>state() ∗∗ left.right−>state();
loop invariant cur contents == (tolist(left.left) + seq<int>{left.data} + tolist(left.right))
22 + seq<int>{cur.data} + tolist(cur.right);
loop invariant wand:(cur.state contains(tail(cur contents)) −∗ top.state contains(target contents)); @∗/
24 while (left.left != null) /∗@ with {
create {} wand:(top.state contains(target contents) −∗ top.state contains(target contents));
26 } @∗/
{ /∗@ Tree prev = cur;
28 seq<int> prev contents = cur contents; ∗/
cur = left;
30 left = cur.left;
/∗@
32 unfold left.state();
cur contents = tolist(left.left) + seq<int>{left.data} + tolist(left.right);
34 cur contents = cur contents + seq<int>{cur.data} + tolist(cur.right);
assert prev contents.length > 0 ;
36 assert cur contents.length > 0 ;
assert prev contents == cur contents + seq<int>{prev.data} + tolist(prev.right);
38 create {
use prev contents.length > 0 ;
40 use cur contents.length > 0 ;
use Perm(prev.left,100)∗∗Perm(prev.data,100);
42 use Perm(prev.right,100)∗∗prev.right−>state();
use prev.left==cur;
44 use prev contents == cur contents + seq<int>{prev.data} + tolist(prev.right);
fold prev.state();
46 apply wand:(prev.state contains(tail(prev contents)) −∗ top.state contains(target contents));
qed wand:(cur.state contains(tail(cur contents)) −∗ top.state contains(target contents));
48 }
@∗/
50 }
cur.left = left.right;
52 //@ fold cur.state();
//@ assert cur.contents()==tail(cur contents);
54 //@ apply wand:(cur.state contains(tail(cur contents)) −∗ top.state contains(target contents));
return top;
56 }
}
58 }
Fig. 17. Fully annotated version of iterative tree delete algorithm
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class List {
2 /∗@
resource state();
4 @∗/
6 /∗@
ensures state();
8 @∗/
public List();
10
/∗@
12 requires state();
ensures state();
14 @∗/
public void put(int v);
16 }
Fig. 19. Specification of an integer list
VerCors
public class ListIterator {
2 /∗@
resource ready();
4 resource readyForNext();
resource readyForRemove();
6 @∗/
8 /∗@
requires l!=null ∗∗ l.state();
10 ensures ready();
ensures wand:(ready() −∗ l.state());
12 @∗/
public ListIterator(List l);
14
/∗@
16 requires ready();
ensures \result ==> readyForNext();
18 ensures !\result ==> ready();
@∗/
20 boolean hasNext();
22 /∗@
requires readyForNext();
24 ensures readyForRemove();
ensures wand:(readyForRemove()−∗ready());
26 @∗/
int next();
28
/∗@
30 requires readyForRemove();
ensures ready();
32 @∗/
void remove();
34 }
Fig. 20. Specification of the list iterator
VerCors
/∗@
2 requires l!=null ∗∗ l.state();
ensures l.state();
4 @∗/
void main(List l){
6 boolean b;
l.put(1);
8 l.put(0);
l.put(−1);
10 ListIterator i;
//@ witness recover:(i.ready() −∗ l.state());
12 //@ witness keep:(i.readyForRemove() −∗ i.ready());
i=new ListIterator(l) /∗@ then { recover = wand; } ∗/;
14 b=i.hasNext();
/∗@
16 loop invariant b ==> i.readyForNext();
loop invariant !b ==> i.ready();
18 @∗/
while(b){
20 int tmp=i.next() /∗@ then { keep = wand ;} ∗/;
if (tmp<0) {
22 i.remove();
} else {
24 //@ apply keep:(i.readyForRemove() −∗ i.ready());
}
26 b=i.hasNext();
}
28 //@ apply recover:(i.ready() −∗ l.state());
}
Fig. 21. Example that uses the list and iterator
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced two witness trans-
formations from Java with separation logic annotations
into a form that can be checked with Chalice. The first
transformation replaces predicates with parameters by
witness objects with parameter-free predicates (except
for the implicit this parameter). The second transforma-
tion replaces magic wands by witness objects. To over-
come undecidability when reasoning about magic wands,
the user has to provide a proof script that can be used to
check that resources are indeed correctly exchanged by
the magic wand. Both transformations are not Chalice-
specific, i.e., in principle they can be used as an en-
coding for any object-oriented language with separation
logic annotations. This is reflected in the implementa-
tion, which will remove the witness extensions and re-
place them with objects and simpler predicates. In this
process unknown expressions and annotation are simply
copied, which means that the current implementation
will work for other similar back-ends without modifica-
tion. However, it might require additional or different
proof hints.
In this paper, we have shown that the transforma-
tions that we define are sound and complete, i.e., if the
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original specification is correct, if and only if the trans-
formed specification is correct.
It should be emphasised that all examples in this
paper have been machine-checked, however we feel it is
too early to make any claim about the class of programs
that can be validated with our approach: the fact that a
proof exists does not always mean that it can be found
automatically by a prover.
To illustrate our approach, we have presented two
larger examples: the tree delete example, which demon-
strates how magic wands can be used in loop invariants,
and the iterator example, which shows how a magic wand
is used to enforce that method calls happen in the pre-
scribed order. Both examples with full annotations are
automatically verified by the VerCors tool set. In this
paper, we have not presented an example that uses both
witness transformations at the same time, but such an
example is available online.
7.1 Related Work
The Tree Delete Challenge Our use of the magic wand
to verify the iterative implementation of the tree delete
algorithm is just one of the ways of solving the tree delete
challenge. Another way of solving the problem is using
Tu¨rk’s rule for loops [41], which effectively offers the pos-
sibility of writing loop annotations as if the loop were a
recursive function. In other words, the loop body can
contain a block of proof hints, whose application is de-
layed, forming a stack of delayed proof steps. When the
loop exits, all delayed steps are applied. As these steps
can implicitly set aside resources too, each delayed step
is equivalent to a magic wand. The advantage of using
magic wand syntax rather than the Tu¨rk rule is that
magic wands can be used in any location in the code,
whereas the Tu¨rk rule is only applicable to loops. Yet
another mechanism for specifying the iterative version
of the tree delete problem is by using block contracts.
The Krakatoa tool [14] implements this generalization
of the Tu¨rk rule, which allows attaching pre- and post-
conditions to arbitrary statement blocks, instead of just
to loop bodies.
The tree delete challenge can also be addressed by us-
ing the Zipper data structure from functional program-
ming [21]. This is an alternative way to treat the shift of
focus: with little it allows to write the invariant in such a
way that in each iteration the focus is shifted by one step.
Once the left-most node is removed, the Zipper structure
allows to move the focus back to the root. To use a Zip-
per structure, one would have to write the basic data
structure, which requires quite a few lines of specifica-
tion, but which can easily be automated. For those cases
where the pre-defined functions work, the annotation
work load would then be limited to a few instructions
that move the focus. However, if a non-standard move
is required, it would have to be spelled out completely
at a considerable specification effort, because only pre-
defined moves would be automatically generated.
Tool Support The VeriFast tool implements lemmas [25],
which are equivalent to a subset of magic wands. That is,
lemmas can transform sets of resources, just like magic
wand can. But magic wands can exchange resources as
well, for example, a magic wand can express the capa-
bility to exchange a read-only permission for accessing
a location on the heap to a full write permission for the
same location. If one were to express this using a lemma,
the lemma would have to be paired with a predicate that
captures the extra permissions in order to match the
functionality of the magic wand.
Jost and Summers have written a tool that translates
VeriFast specification to Chalice [26]. They analyse Ver-
iFast predicates to see if they can be split into a param-
eterless permission predicate and a boolean function. If
such a split is impossible they resort to using ghost vari-
ables in the object to represent the predicate parame-
ters. The advantage of such an approach is that it leads
to a simpler encoding that requires less annotations to
be verified. The disadvantage is that the encoding does
not work if the same predicate must be held twice on
the same object, whereas our encoding supports this.
Automated proving for special cases of the magic
wand is being worked on. For example, in the setting
of the logic of boolean bunched implications (a close rel-
ative of separation logic) Park et al. have given an algo-
rithm for deciding the magic wand [32]. Further, Atkey
has shown that for a restricted magic wand syntax it is
possible to directly derive verification conditions [2].
Finally, the transformation that turns magic wands
into objects resembles defunctionalization of closures in
a functional programming language (see for example [38]).
The specification style of the generated object, defin-
ing a valid predicate is inspired by the standard method-
ology for Boogie of Barnett et al. [4].
7.2 Future Work
Annotation Generation Clearly, the major drawback of
our approach is the large number of (long) annotations
that the user has to provide at the moment. To address
this issue, we will first of all investigate heuristics to
come up with good default specifications. We will also
investigate if methods for automatically deriving speci-
fications can be adapted to our situation. For example,
it might be possible to use the constraint solving algo-
rithm developed by Ferrara and Mu¨ller [13] to infer a
large number of the witness management annotations.
Additionally, as mentioned above, the approach taken
by Jost and Summers in their translation of VeriFast to
Chalice can deal with a number of cases with less anno-
tation load. We will study if we can integrate their work,
so that the simple cases can take advantage of their en-
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coding, while the encoding of this paper can be used for
more complicated cases.
The current implementation of the witness transfor-
mation for magic wands requires that all the resources
that are stored inside the magic wand are explicitly men-
tioned using the use keyword. The problem of finding out
which resources have to be stored is similar to the prob-
lem of finding out which resources to pass to a method
during a call and which resources to keep. Therefore, we
will study the techniques for solving this, such as the use
of frame inference and bi-abduction [9], and see if they
can be reused and/or adapted to our approach.
Extensions We believe the witness encoding approach
can be extended to basic permissions on fields too. Such
an extension replaces the permissions-as-logic-formulas
view completely by a permissions-as-a-data-type view.
This would make any check on permissions executable,
enabling the re-use of existing run-time checkers for run-
time checking of permissions. It might even be possible
to reuse existing static verifiers that do not support per-
missions, however there is a risk that this would even
further increase the annotation workload, which would
make this approach practically unfeasible.
We are currently investigating how permission-based
separation logic can be used to reason about Scala pro-
grams. This requires the possibility to specify the be-
haviour of closures. We are investigating if we can extend
our approach also to encode closure specifications.
We also plan to further investigate if temporal as-
pects have an impact on the encoding. In the current
encoding, everything in the footprint of the magic wand
is evaluated in the current state, while everything else is
evaluated against the state in which the magic wand is
eventually applied. We have to investigate further if this
causes any problems.
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